Asimetri Akuntabilitas dalam Diskresi Penuntutan DPA Pasca-Kuhap 2025: Model Structured Prosecutorial Discretion untuk Pengujian Penolakan Permohonan Deferred Prosecution Agreement

Abstract

Law Number 20 of 2025 on the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code introduces the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) as a corporate criminal resolution mechanism. Article 328 establishes a two-stage architecture: the Public Prosecutor first accepts or rejects the application, while an agreement that has been reached must be submitted to the court for examination and approval. Supreme Court Circular Letter Number 1 of 2026 strengthens judicial control over concluded DPAs. The unresolved issue lies at the initial refusal stage. A refusal terminates the DPA pathway and returns the case to ordinary proceedings, yet the KUHAP does not expressly establish a dedicated forum to review the reasons for that refusal. This article examines the resulting accountability asymmetry and proposes structured prosecutorial discretion as a criminal policy design. It employs normative legal research using statutory, conceptual, case, and comparative approaches. Newly added materials on prosecutorial discretion, judicial review of DPAs, internal oversight, and refusal of Brazil's non-prosecution agreement are used to deepen the analysis. The study finds that the central problem is not the existence of prosecutorial discretion, but the absence of a structure requiring discretion to operate through criteria, reasons, documentation, and reviewability. The proposed model consists of an eligibility matrix, written reasons, tiered internal review, centralized recording, periodic monitoring and evaluation, and an escalation clause. Internal oversight is positioned as the primary safeguard, while expanded judicial review is reserved for later legislative reform if internal controls prove inadequate.